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Christianity and Society

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Our Foreign Policy . . .

- **A Reappraisal of American Foreign Policy**
  Kenneth W. Thompson

- **The United Nations and American Policy**
  Justin Wroe Nixon

- **Tariffs, Trade, and Raw Materials**
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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

A Quarterly devoted to Christianity and Social Reconstruction

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CHRISTIAN ACTION

Christianity and Society is published by Christian Action, a fellowship of Christians concerned with the social implications of their faith. Christian Action seeks:

To understand current social issues in the light of central Christian convictions.

To provide a fellowship for mutual support and criticism among Christians who are profoundly concerned about the social problems of our time.

To encourage groups of Christians to act creatively and responsibly in their local communities as well as in national and international affairs.

To develop a core of common convictions and principles for the strengthening of the Christian social witness.

New ways to influence the churches and secular society in the direction of greater responsibility to all members of the community.

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CHRISTIANITY and SOCIETY

EDITORIALS

The Churches and the United Nations

The devotion of the Christian churches to the principle of the United Nations and to the policy of our loyalty as a nation to that organization, is a part of a long and consistent history of American Christianity. Our loyalty to the United Nations is in a sense merely a symbol of our loyalty to the principles of international cooperation and our responsibility to the international community. The United Nations is merely the most current instrument of this international cooperation and therefore the most immediate vehicle of our commitments. But there has always been a danger in this commitment, and that is, that we are loyal to the principle of international cooperation in the abstract, and that as a nation we have too little concern for those acts of daily fidelity through which an international community comes into being. It is as if we were committed to the principle of monogamy but had little concern for the life of forbearance and love which makes marriage possible and tolerable. We ought therefore, as churches, emphasize not so much the abstract principle of international responsibility as we ought to bring Christian resources to bear upon the tremendous problem of a great and rich nation, relating itself tolerably to a weak and impoverished world.

Two developments emphasize the necessity of this course at the present moment. On the one hand Europe is engulfed in a wave of anti-American feeling, which could well aggravate our own nationalist reactions. This anti-American feeling has both justified and unjustified roots. On the one hand it is simply the reaction of weak nations to a powerful one; on the other hand it represents a resentment against various dubious aspects of American policy. It is going to be very important that we react to what seems to us the ingratitude of European nations with a measure of patience and forbearance. If we do not, the whole community of free nations is threatened.

Another current development which teaches us the lesson of forbearance is the Indian proposal for an armistice. While we have rightly been adamant on the principle of not forcing prisoners of war back to communist tyranny, it is also felt by our allies in the United Nations that we were inflexible in our attitude toward the Indian proposal in the United Nations. This proposal was so full of hope that it won the support of many of our friends and changed the inflexibility of our attitude. It showed, in other words, that the United Nations is, in spite of weakness, an effective forum where world opinion can be brought to bear upon American policy.

Before these lines are read we will know whether or not this proposal will actually lead to an armistice. That event depends upon whether or not China is using the prisoner of war issue as a way of prolonging the war. But the success or failure of the proposal, important as the issue is, does not affect the lesson of patience and forbearance taught us here. It is a lesson this powerful nation must learn again and again. We in the churches must help the conscience of the nation on this issue. We

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have things to say here which spring from the heart of the Christian Gospel.

Reinhold Niebuhr

John Foster Dulles

The appointment of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State is an event of unusual importance in American church life as well as in the political history of our times. Mr. Dulles for fifteen years has been one of the two or three most influential lay leaders in American Protestantism. In the field of foreign policy, the very field in which he will now have more power than anyone else except the President, he has often been the spokesman of Protestantism. No clergyman has had as much influence in forming the mind of the churches and no clergyman has been regarded as having as good a right to speak for the churches in that area as Mr. Dulles. At the Amsterdam Assembly in 1948 when an American Christian spokesman on international affairs was sought to give a major speech, Mr. Dulles was chosen.

It is obvious that there will be a very serious danger today of confusing the words and deeds of Mr. Dulles in his new position with the words and deeds of the churches. There will be a temptation for many people to assume that, with Mr. Dulles at the helm, our foreign policy will have some claim to be a Christian foreign policy. If Mr. Dulles talks about his policy from now on as he has sometimes talked about the Japanese treaty he may at times even encourage this view.

If the presence in such a position of power of a leading layman who has given a great deal of himself to the churches is an embarrassment to them, that is itself a cause for some reflection. Are we to suppose that the Christian vocation of laymen is only to be welcomed if they are not very powerful? No, the answer to the question implied in the suggestion that there may be some embarrassment here is that the only way to avoid such embarrassment is to have more such men so that the churches are not so readily identified with one man. If more men in *both* the major political parties and with somewhat varied social and economic views were in positions of leadership in the churches comparable to that of Mr. Dulles, there would be no cause for embarrassment.

It is important for us at this time to remember the things that Mr. Dulles stood for when he led the work of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace. During the period of the Second World War the leadership of Mr. Dulles was superb. He was the chief architect of a program which was one of the most significant achievements of American Protestantism in its efforts to influence public opinion on international issues. He was always very careful in his judgments, always responsive to what he could find to be Christian guidance on the problems in hand, cautious but never reactionary, willing to listen to others. He was always ready to emphasize the humanitarian aspect of foreign policy. He always showed an understanding of the aspirations of the people under colonial domination.

Above all, he always saw that military measures must be kept subordinate to "creative and curative" measures. He knows as well as anyone does that a third world war, even if we were victorious, would serve totalitarianism rather than freedom. If Mr. Dulles has not fundamentally changed since the days of his major work for the Federal Council, he can be counted on to throw his weight on the side of a sound balance between military and non-military approaches to the present world conflict. This would include loyalty to the United Nations as a cornerstone of policy.

It would not be honest to write about Mr. Dulles in 1953 without saying that two episodes in his recent career cause many of those who admired his work with the Federal Council of Churches to have mixed feelings about his appointment. One of these episodes was his campaign for the Senate where he seemed at times to descend to a surprisingly low level of reactionary demagoguery. One example of this was his description of Federal aid to education as "thought control". He seemed to be out of character, for all of his previous utter-

nces, whether one agreed with them or not, had been very responsible. Perhaps this was only another case of a candidate in the hands of the wrong speechwriters.

The second episode was his relation to the recent campaign. He seemed, all of a sudden, to improvise a new foreign policy to unite the opposing wings of the Republican Party. His policy of retaliation against the centers of communist power appealed to Senator Taft and seemed to offer a cheaper form of security, but it had within it two dangers: the danger of developing into a unilateral American policy that would lose us most of our friends, and the danger of turning a passing incident into the occasion of total war.

During the campaign Mr. Dulles seemed to exchange the role of statesman for that of a Republican politician looking for an issue. His distinction between containment and liberation proved on examination to lack substance, but it gave him a chance to score a point against the administration in whose high councils he had so recently served. His suggestion that the containment policy was immoral was an example of his too ready tendency to see issues in black and white moral terms. If containment was the policy most in keeping with America's power, and least likely to lead to a reckless plunge into a catastrophe that would leave most of its human victims beyond the possibility of liberation, it was defensible as a moral policy.

But it is to be hoped that campaigns are not the best test of the quality of a man. We can think of others besides Mr. Dulles to whom this statement applies. Mr. Dulles quickly snapped back after the 1950 campaign and became a creative statesman again. We try to focus our attention now upon the Dulles who for many years brought much wisdom into Christian thinking about the problems of a just and durable peace.

John C. Bennett

The Meaning of the Shift in Soviet Policy

While we were preoccupied with the Presidential election the Communist Party held one of its infrequent conventions. This convention was made notable by a shift in the Party line through the authoritative voice of Stalin. The shift was accomplished by a change of emphasis from one communist dogma to another: from the dogma which asserts the inevitability of war between communist and capitalist states to one which predicts war between capitalist states. We would do well to heed this shift, for it offers us both a measure of reassurance against a communist initiated war and a measure of apprehension about the unity of the free world.

The shift in line certainly means that the communists will do all they can to sow discord in our world. Communist dogmas are oversimplifications of social and political facts. There is, of course, no danger of war between the so-called capitalist states, but there is a great deal of danger of disunity and friction. Communist irrationality differs from the irrationality of its twin tyranny, fascism. The communists do not rely on intuitive apprehensions of political realities. They subject the facts to cool calculations; but their calculations are governed by dogmatic presuppositions which generally obscure some of the facts.

Insofar as communist irrationality keeps the communist oligarchy in the dark about the realities of our world it represents a real danger. But the dogmatic faith that the capitalist world is destroying itself by its own inherent contradictions is in a sense a protection against a precipitate initiation of hostilities by Russia. The communists will naturally not join the issue with our world in a military venture so long as they have the confidence that we will weaken ourselves.

But we have reason to be concerned, because there are some noticeable and growing points of friction between ourselves and the other nations, and between some of the

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free nations such as France and Germany. In England Bevanism is growing. In France a Prime Minister friendly to us thought it necessary to make a strong anti-American statement in order to save his government. France deeply resents our interference in its Tunisian affairs, and is unreconciled to the inclusion of Germany in the European defense community.

The greatest hazard to a harmonious relation between ourselves and the weak and impoverished nations of Europe and Asia lies in American tariff policies. We may be generous in our distribution of Marshall Plan aid, but the European nations feel more and more definitely that they would prefer a healthy trade for our dollars to handouts from our Treasury. We may expect some real pressure upon the Administration in regard to tariffs in the near future. This will be a healthy reminder to us that we must exercise our responsibility not primarily in terms of military aid or in terms of abstract constitutional plans.

The big question which faces us as a nation is whether we can cultivate enough patience and modesty to hold the free world together under our leadership.

Reinhold Niebuhr

Suggested Reading

United States Foreign Policy

Together We Are Strong. Department of State Publication 4614. U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. 39 pages. 20 cents.

The Only War We Seek, by Arthur Goodfriend. Farrar, Straus & Young for Americans for Democratic Action, 1740 "K" St., N.W., Washington 6. D. C. 1951. $1.00.

Strengthening Our Foreign Policy. Public Affairs Pamphlet 189. 22 E. 38th St., New York 16, N. Y. 28 pages. 25 cents.

How to Make Friends for the US, by Vera M. Dean and J. Bartlet Brebner. Headline Series, 1952. Foreign Policy Association. 61 pages. 35 cents.

International Trade and Economic Nationalism, by J. B. Condliffe. *International Conciliation,* December, 1951. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 405 W. 117th St., New York 27, N. Y. 15 cents.

United Nations

The Moral Implications of Loyalty to the United Nations, by Reinhold Niebuhr. Hazen Pamphlet 29. 400 Prospect St., New Haven 11, Conn. 14 pages. 25 cents.

Collective Security, by Andrew Martin. Published for UNESCO by Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. 243 pages. $1.25.

The United Nations — Action for Peace, by Marie R. Zocca and Louis R. Zocca. Order from American Association for the United Nations, 45 E. 64th St., New York 21, N. Y. 1951. 60 pages. 30 cents.

The Hate Campaign Against the UN: One World Under Attack, by Gordon D. Hall. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952. (25 Beacon St., Boston 8, Mass.) 50 cents.

The Current Attacks on the United Nations and UNESCO. Report of the American Friends' Service Committee, Pacific Southwest Region, 825 Herkimer St., Pasadena 4, Calif., May, 1952. Free.

The United Nations at Work. No. 1, "Human Rights in the United Nations", by Charles Malik; No. 2, "The Record and Responsibilities of the Economic and Social Council"; No. 3, "World Social Situation Today". Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York. 15 cents each.

Periodicals on U.N.

United Nations Bulletin. Published by U.N. Department of Public Information. Order from International Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Semi-monthly. $4.50 per year.

UNESCO Courier. Published by UNESCO. Order from International Documents Service. Monthly. $1.00 per year.

A Reappraisal of American Foreign Policy

Kenneth W. Thompson

Following any election, the President-elect and his party are to a point at least bound by their campaign promises to re-examine existing policies. At present, the exigencies of the war in Korea, the stresses and strains within the West's developing "Grand Alliance", and the crisis in confidence at home have accelerated the process.

From one standpoint this is a virture inherent in democratic systems, which cannot tolerate immunity for any policy from constant review. Inasmuch as politics involves choices from among imperfect alternatives, almost every decision must be surveyed periodically in the light of changing circumstances.

On the international scene, however, where the alternatives are conspicuously more limited and where continuity and perserverance are as important as the substantive elements of policy, this virtue is not necessarily an unmixed blessing. Indeed foreign policy lends itself so poorly to the partisan spirit of indiscriminate praise and blame which dominates even the most responsible campaigns, that some wise observers have despaired for its success. De Tocqueville found that: "Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient."

Patience, preparedness, and unity in the face of the paralyzing demands for actions which can never be fully rational or wholly successful would place an overwhelming burden even on people better schooled in world politics than this youthful nation. At the time of the founding of the Republic Alexander Hamilton in *Federalist Paper No. 75* concluded: "Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character; decision, *secrecy*, and dispatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and numerous."

The appeals that are made to a body as numerous and impulsive as American public opinion reflect precisely these defects that troubled de Tocqueville and Hamilton.

At present there are three distinct levels on which the reappraisal of American foreign policy might be conducted: (1) the areas of the regnant philosophy of international politics, (2) the day-by-day operations of foreign policy, and (3) the fundamental objectives of that policy. There is little evidence that the coming re-examination of American foreign policy will concern itself with the first of these dimensions. There are numerous signs it will devote its resources unstintingly to issues arising in the second sphere. As yet we have little reason to think that special attention will be paid to the third and most basic area. Our purpose here will be to raise a few of the perplexing questions that fall within each of these spheres.

I

From a pragmatic standpoint at least, Americans have come to terms with their environment in almost every orbit of life by erecting plausible theories that make their behavior and problems intelligible.

Throughout American history there has been a certain fortuitous coincidence between philosophy and the needs of certain dominant groups and, on occasion, society as a whole. The massive industrial expansion which propelled us to a position of towering eminence in the world drew its vital energy from "the Protestant ethic". The association by that ethic of efficiency and thrift with virtue was in some ways as much a factor in our remarkable industrial growth as the rich resources our pioneer forefathers discovered. For men

were more likely to strive for industrial prominence if their attainments were accorded ethical status. Our prevailing belief in the primacy of private over public enterprise, our unquestioning acceptance of progress as inevitable, and our conviction that self interest and the general welfare were simply and directly related—all have contributed to our unparalleled military, scientific, and technical accomplishments.

Yet these ruling conceptions about man and politics which are responsible for our development nationally have at the same time destroyed our capacity to confront international issues steadily and realistically. In other words, our domestic experience and thought is partly responsible for the absence of any coherent American outlook on the nature of international politics.

We have failed to come to grips with the underlying forces in contemporary international society, either denying that they existed or insisting they could, by the application of reason, be quickly supplanted. Therefore in this sphere we have been unsuccessful in constructing a philosophy that was plausible either at home or abroad. The needs of the nation, politically and strategically, have either been given a narrow military construction—as in the tendency to fight wars exclusively for military objectives—or have in words and declarations been universalized by saying that our interests were equivalent to those of the United Nations or of the world. Thus whereas groups within our society have pursued their own interests, often covering them with a tissue of "lies" or rationalizations, isolationists and internationalists for opposing reasons have often argued that the nation was under no compulsion to act self-consciously to safeguard its needs.

There are at least three concrete consequences of our failure to construct a convincing philosophy of international politics.

Our Shifting Moods

1. The first consequence of this failure has been the uncertain and vacillating *moods* in which the United States has approached practical problems in its foreign policies since the end of World War I.

By denying that power politics was more than a passing phase of world affairs, American foreign policy has fallen prey to three illusions that have weakened our approach to the rest of the world. *Ultimately,* power politics would be eliminated through establishing a universal world government. *Practically,* power politics could be abolished by destroying its main exemplars, the totalitarian states. *Provisionally,* power politics was to be ameliorated and progressively undermined by the example of moral and upright nations foreswearing relations with corrupted and power-seeking nations, that is, by abstaining from traditional power politics. These illusions have, in reverse order, found concrete expression in policies of neutrality, unconditional surrender, and utopianism. We have imagined that this country could deal with the environment of unregulated competition among nations more conclusively, decisively, and simply than other nations had done in the past. Each of these outlooks assumed that the international environment could be readily transformed.

Thus, before both World Wars the United States sought to withdraw or abstain from the corrupt form of international politics being practiced on the European continent. Any concession in terms of territorial guarantees against German expansion would have been unworthy of our philosophy. Any intervention in European affairs for the purpose of strengthening the Weimar Republic would have weakened the example of our moral position.

We held to the policy of neutrality until the eve of World War II. When at length we were driven to participate in that war, we justified our action by the precepts of a holy crusade against the evil incarnate in fascism. This was a war not for selfish political advantage or mere territorial adjustments. It was a crusade—as was World War I—for advancing the spread of democracy and for eliminating and destroying those evil men and ideals who alone made

conflict inevitable. With their annihilation through total campaigns of "unconditional surrender", rivalry and aggression would cease. The problems which might arise if these countries became power vacuums, were not seriously considered.

Finally, American foreign policy has aimed to complete its transformation of the world scene by creating novel agencies of international government as substitutes for archaic power politics. Following both world wars, the agents of power politics lay mortally wounded; now the climate in which their nefarious policies had thrived must be cleansed and transformed and international organization substituted for politics. In the brave new world the problem of power would disappear.

Some saw the United Nations as fulfilling these aims. Others insisted that a more effective world government was necessary and possible. But each, far from accepting international society as they found it, formulated foreign policies which assumed its expected transformation. This is the factor common to the separate policies of neutrality, unconditional surrender, and utopianism. All rejected the concept that politics "is not so much the consequence of mind meeting mind as of interest balanced by interest". They rejected the tragic dilemma of present day international relations, which is one of nations desiring security but finding themselves locked in conflict with one another over unresolved and clashing interests. Thus they had and can have no place for the policies that Burke emphasized in his maxim: "It is one of the greatest objects of human wisdom to mitigate those evils which we are unable to remove."

Our Self-Deception

2. The second consequence of the failure to approach the sphere of international politics realistically is the tendency to overestimate our resources and power.

We have never been a great land power on the mainland of Asia and at present our moral authority is low throughout Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Yet perennially voices are raised urging us to carry the war into China and settle the troublesome Far Eastern situation decisively.

Thus the real issue is obscured from the people, which is that militarily we are weak in Asia; and even if through alliances and great sacrifices we could remedy this defect, we would still be greatly handicapped by our moral disfavor there. For we are white and Asia is colored. We are rich and large parts of Asia are impoverished. Yet the defects in the American philosophy of world affairs have been largely responsible for the neglect of these problems. Since we have denied the importance of power it could hardly be re-introduced as a limitation on American external affairs.

Our Desire for Easy Answers

3. A third consequence of our failure to face the international scene resolutely has been a preference for simple answers and decisive solutions to the most baffling and perplexing problems.

The Western diplomat traditionally has looked at foreign policy as the management of a nation's troubles. Americans, however, have asked something more of their contemporary leaders. The concept of finding the solution least unsettling to the equilibrium of the world has lacked the glamor of policies that promised salvation through one rational action like writing a world constitution. Therefore the moral energy of the people has been channeled into programs with little relationship to reality but free of the moral ambiguities of contemporary world politics.

The three consequences we have mentioned—pursuing unwise foreign policies since World War I, overestimating our national resources, and rejecting the concept of politics as the reduction in contrast to the elimination of our problems—have strengthened and reinforced one another. As a result we have been ill-prepared to meet the threat of Russian power and imperialism.

II

The review of foreign policy by the new administration will probably deal more specifically with the concrete implementation of our basic foreign policy.

We are engaged at various points around the globe in conflict with the Soviet Union; and since our resources are not unlimited, certain far-reaching decisions must be made about the allocation of men and material among these commitments. In part this involves a re-examination of the policy of containment. It involves a reappraisal of the scope of containment and an assessment of what we have done. For we may at present be seeking to contain Soviet forces with one technique when in practice another is needed. Or at some points we may be overextended in our commitments. These estimates must be made at least with respect to Korea, the Far East, and Europe.

Korea

The basic fact about Korea is that the United States at present has only limited power and interests there. Korea not only represents the first bold and courageous effort in collective security; it also has shown us the limits of our power. We have gone no farther on that narrow peninsula primarily because the cost would have outstripped the importance in terms of our other commitments and obligations.

Our most costly and perhaps irreparable mistake was the failure to seek an armistice after the Inchon landing had cleared South Korea of the North Korean aggressors. At that time we might have obtained the armistice we have been trying to negotiate for over a year. Instead General McArthur launched his invasion toward the Yalu River which the Indian Ambassador had reported ten days before would result in China's entrance into the war.

A less fundamental mistake was the lapse that permitted the problem of the prisoners of war to become a burning issue. If we had acted immediately, Chinese and North Korean prisoners might have been released to Formosa or South Korea. Instead they were detained and their names sent to the enemy authorities. Thus there arose an almost insoluble problem. The anti-communist prisoners could not be returned to North Korea and China and an almost certain death. On the other hand, the communist governments were hardly able to accept our proposals, for the West in this way would have won a great moral triumph that the East could ill afford to accept.

Practically, there is little that can be done about past mistakes in the Korean crisis. But there are certain alternatives, narrow and limited to be sure, open to the new administration. It must decide whether a military or a diplomatic solution is possible. And in reaching a decision it must be governed by a secret Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of September 1947, which provided that in a general war, troops in Korea would be a liability and would, for strategic reasons, have to be withdrawn.

In Asia we have quite possibly pursued our policy of containment too far and in too exclusively military terms, for a lasting solution will come about there only by approaching the problems of the Far East as a whole.

The Far East

The problems confronting a policy of containment in the Far East are not the same problems as those in Europe. In Europe we confront the massive power of a Russian imperialism which stands at the Elbe River. This is a threat we can meet with tolerable success through the creation of situations of military strength, set on a viable politico-economic base. In Asia, by contrast, we are faced not only with Soviet expansionism. Instead the challenge to the West would continue throughout much of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East even if the Soviet Union disappeared tomorrow. There we are faced with whole peoples in seething and turbulent revolt.

The nature of this crisis in Indo-China,

Malaya, Egypt, and Tunisia is significant. The civil war in Indo-China had been going on for three years before the Chinese communists reached its boundaries. Warfare in Malaya had been in progress for over a year before the Chinese communists had driven the nationalists from the mainland. That is, in each of these areas the conflict is not primarily the threat of imperialism—whether Russian or Chinese as the case may be—for before Chinese power was in a position to aid and abet these conflicts, they were already being waged in full force. Neither Egypt nor Tunisia is under any immediate threat of external communist invasion. Yet the crisis in Egypt and Tunisia is just as real because of the social revolutions going on. To resist communism at such points through a policy of containment based on military strength alone can hardly lead to success.

Instead an effective foreign policy for these areas depends in the first instance on the recognition of the existence of these revolutionary movements. It is barely possible that communism associated with revolutionary forces will sweep over all of Asia. To help avert this threat, we must do all we can to reverse the widespread belief among Asians that the forces arrayed against social change are the United States and the West.

In the foreseeable future our weapons in this struggle will remain strictly limited and the obstacles against us will be enormous. But the precarious road to success is not solely one of concentration of military strength at numerous points of danger or the continued denial of the claims to authority of albeit suspicious and unfriendly forces like the Chinese communists. For if the Chinese are communists they are also Chinese even as the Russians are Russians and the Yugoslavs are Yugoslavs. Recent experiences have had a sobering effect on premature and over-sanguine hopes that within a fortnight Mao would prove to be another Tito. Yet at the same time the history of world politics makes it abundantly clear that the clash of national interests has divided allies whose ideological unity was never ostensibly effaced.

Europe

The problems of Europe will confront the new administration with a series of inescapable dilemmas. We seek to resist the Soviet Union through the revival of Western Germany's power. The Germans are striving for the reunification of Germany. Our aims and theirs, if not incompatible, at least call for the most sober balancing and evaluation. Moreover, German rearmament can be controlled and integrated only within a united Western Europe. But German rearmament is one of the issues dividing European nations.

In much the same way, France has been faced with dilemmas that up to now have paralyzed its capacity for action. France seeks security through integration with its long-time chief foe, Germany. French opinion following each major war has feared a revival of German aggression. While many responsible French leaders today admit that the international situation calls for the calculated risks involved in the Schuman or Pleven Plans, a vital segment of French opinion has maintained that the advantages do not justify the risk that a revived and rearmed Germany will once more be able to assert its hegemony over Europe.

These dilemmas respecting France, Germany, and Europe will hardly be solved by the kind of sterile formulas produced at the Lisbon conference.

Nor should the new government expect success from a policy of resistance to communism based on assistance to governments whose survival is wholly dependent on the economic transfusions the United States periodically supplies, unless a somewhat greater measure of justice can be assured for the proletariat as well as industrialists, within countries receiving our aid, than was true under the Marshall Plan.

III

Containment from many standpoints is, therefore, an unsatisfactory foreign policy. But the alternative of "liberation", offered in the campaign of 1952, is still less desir-

able, as Eisenhower's abandonment of it plainly suggests. For as *The Times* (London) was incautious enough to point out on August 30, 1952:

> Unhappily "liberation" applied to Eastern Europe—and Asia—means either the risk of war or its means nothing. There is no way in the foreseeable future in which Poland and Czechoslovakia can be released from Soviet bondage except by force of arms. In Asia the situation is even more discouraging, since the bulk of the Chinese would probably actively resist "liberation". Even to incite Eastern Europeans to seek for liberation entails the risk of world war, for if they were to rise against their Russian masters—as the Poles did in 1864—America and its allies would have the choice of intervening to support the rebels or of suffering the shame that came Palmerston's way. . . .

Still there remain, if we accept this evaluation, two unsolved problems in connection with containment. The first is that containment in itself is not eough. The Soviet empire with its 750 million people occupying what is called the heartland of the world is now more formidable than the Western coalition. Eventually the Red army and the threat it presents must be rolled back and the awful deterioration at the heart of Europe be eased.

There are only two ways this goal can conceivably be brought about. The one is the solution of a preventive war which impatient voices in the United States have urged. The other is the achievement of some form of settlement which Mr. Churchill has challenged the West to undertake on no less than forty-two occasions since 1945. To drift along without any attempt at negotiation cannot but lead to war.

Finally the new administration must discover a formula appropriate to the application of containment throughout Asia and other areas in revolt. There, containment cannot mean support for the *status quo* everywhere and at all times. For no world empire in history has been capable of resisting change everywhere in the political universe.

Among Those Present

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The United Nations and American Policy

Justin Wroe Nixon

These are fateful days. A new American President has been elected. Another party, for twenty years in opposition, is taking over our government. The cold war with Russia continues. The struggle in Korea moves, at this writing, toward no foreseeable conclusion. It is possible that the international scene may change suddenly and strikingly. Nevertheless certain fundamental aspects of that scene are likely to persist. Let us take a quick look at some of these aspects and at the challenge they present to American Christians who want their faith and their actions to be relevant to the issues of the times.

I

Near the center of concern for multitudes of American Christians stands the United Nations. Many Christians hailed the adoption of the U.N. Charter as a great forward step in the spiritual as well as the political history of man. Now seven years old, the United Nations suffers from many attacks and there are numerous public expressions of uncertainty as to its future. What lies behind this uncertainty?

The United Nations was formed originally to maintain the peace which it was believed, in 1945, would follow the war. The responsibility for the terms of peace and for policing the aggressor nations—particularly Germany and Japan—was left to the victorious powers, the United States, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, France, and China.

On the assumption that peace was to be established by mutual agreement of the victorious powers, the U.N. was set up as an international organization through which "curative and creative forces" could work to heal the wounds of conflict and to weld the peoples of the earth through participation in common tasks into "one world". "To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression", "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character and in . . . encouraging respect for human rights"—these were some of the ringing clauses of the Preamble and Chapter I of the Charter that defined the purposes of the United Nations.

Implementation of U. N. Purposes

Nor were these purposes left without implementation. In a Security Council consisting of five permanent and six non-permanent members, the Charter vested "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". In a General Assembly which included representatives of all the member nations was vested the authority to "discuss any questions" relating to the preservation of peace. These two principal institutions, plus the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat, comprised the six organs of the United Nations.

In addition numerous specialized agencies and commissions were set up to free the peoples from ignorance, hunger, poverty, and disease, and to furnish channels through which they could cooperate in attacking common problems. These agencies have been at work drawing upon scientific, educational, and technical resources of many nations and applying them to the relief and upbuilding of the underdeveloped areas of the globe. No one can read the reports of the World Health Organization (WHO) and of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), to mention only two of these agencies, without realizing that forces have been released that promise vast improvements over the years in the earthly lot of man.

Important also has been the political influence of the U.N. upon the peoples that are emerging from a state of dependence into one of self-government. Since the U.N. was organized, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Jordan, Israel, Korea, and Indonesia—states including one-fourth of the world's population—have won their independence. Some of these states have drawn upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the U.N., in framing their constitutions. All of them have found a dignified status in the councils of the new world organization.

The Uncertainty of U. N. Success

Why then the uncertainty to which we have referred—uncertainty as to the future of the U.N.? It arises from the doubt that affects many minds as to whether the U.N. can accomplish its major purpose, which is to prevent war and maintain peace. In spite of genuine successes, as in promoting the Israeli-Arab armistice, in mediating between India and Pakistan, and in helping to end the conflict in Indonesia, the U.N. now confronts a situation it was not designed to meet—threatened hostilities between great powers. The U.N. was not intended originally to coerce great nations pulling the peoples apart into two worlds. The veto, left with the permanent members of the Security Council, was in itself a guarantee that the U.N. could take no forceful action against a member that chose to use the veto. But the aggression of the North Koreans, supported subsequently by Communist China, precipitated a change in the structure of the U.N. It is now possible for the Assembly to make a detour around the Security Council, when that body is paralyzed by a veto, and make recommendations that may lead to war between its members and one of the great powers.

The question now arises in all seriousness whether the U.N. shall, at this juncture, attempt to use anything beyond moral influence in restraining such a powerful aggressor as China or Russia. It can discuss the issues that threaten war. It can offer mediation. It may pass judgment on the merits of a struggle that impends. But is it a body to summon armies to the field? Should it appoint commanders, determine objectives, plan strategies, or draft the terms of settlements? All of these questions have been raised by the Korean situation.

In any event, if the U.N. should be moved into an all-out war with China on its mainland or with Soviet Russia, it is doubtful whether the U.N. as a world organization could survive. What would remain would be no longer a world organization serving its original purposes but a military alliance serving the common national interests of its members. Such an alliance could only promote the bi-polar pattern of world affairs now developing. It could not hope to prevent the war of "all against all" from which humanity desires so desperately to escape.

It is the uncertainty that arises from such questions as we have just raised that compels us to take account of our own national policy. For what has been happening in the field of national policy during these latter years is due in part to the conviction that the U.N. cannot do all that needs to be done to maintain peace. The policy of individual nations must also contribute to that end. Let us see whether American policy is so contributing.

II

During the last seven years a profound change has occurred in American policy as it is related to the rest of the world. That change has been due to three principal factors. First, there is the expansion of Soviet Russia into the postwar power vacuums west and east of her borders. Second, there is the threat of the communist movement as a force for internal subversion in countries of Europe that lie under the shadow of Russian power. Third, there is the social revolution against age-long poverty and the exploitation of the masses by native feudalism and western colonialism that has been rising in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and other underdeveloped areas of the earth. As American policy has taken account of these factors, a marked reorientation of that policy has been going

n. What are some of the features of this hanged policy?

Balance of Power

It is evident that American policy is now onsciously directed toward the develop- nent of a new balance of power in the vorld. It is possible that such a balance of ower was an unconscious objective of merica's participation in both the great vars of this century. But the idea of the alance of power was denounced by Presi- lent Wilson as "discredited", and it found o place in the speeches of President Roose- elt. How far some leaders of our country vere from entertaining the idea as a con- cious objective, even as late as 1945, is hown by the fact that they considered eriously and started to put into effect the Morgenthau plan for de-industrializing Germany, and hailed with delight the rospect that the new Japan would have o military forces.

But has the military powerlessness of Germany and Japan meant peace? No, it as simply meant that into the power acuums thus created Russian power has owed. The awakening of our government nd of our people to the need of an quilibrium of power in the relations of he nations has been among the rudest in istory. As consequences of that awaken- ng we have had the Truman Doctrine, the ATO pact, the Pacific pact, the accept- nce of our responsibility for leadership in he defense of Korea, our own rearming, nd our cooperation in the rearming of urope west of the Iron Curtain. No one eed be misled by the fact that our states- en do not use the phrase, balance or quilibrium of power. When they speak "leading from situations of strength" and the hope that the Russian and American stems can coexist peacefully after these tuations of strength have been attained, ey are presenting the idea of the balance power in other language.

But can this objective of a balance of ower now being sought by American olicy be reconciled with the functioning the United Nations? Our answer would be that the U.N. cannot function successfully unless this objective is attained. Our own government, as Hamilton and Madison argued so cogently in *The Federalist,* rests on an equilibrium of conflicting interests. If one interest were to be much the stronger, it would tend to dominate, and tyranny would be the likely result. This is all the more true in international affairs where, as yet, we have no government at all. In international affairs, accordingly, even more than in domestic affairs, conflicting interests must themselves take responsibility for achieving an equilibrium. This we believe the United States is trying to do. As long as America seeks this equilibrium publicly through regional pacts, aims to reconcile interests through negotiation, states its case openly, and submits to examination before the U.N. General Assembly, it does not seem to us at this juncture to be imperiling the U.N.'s purposes.

Economic Rehabilitation

Another feature of the changed American policy has come from the menace of communist subversion. We have been particularly concerned with this menace in those countries of Europe that must be kept strong if adequate resistance to Russian aggression is to be built up. We have accepted, accordingly, a measure of responsibility for the economic well-being of these countries. The Marshall Plan is the outstanding expression of this feature of our policy. Marshall Plan funds plus other grants and loans have enabled us to finance our export surplus. The excess of exports over imports in our total foreign trade during the last seven years now amounts to 35 billion dollars.

We are approaching a crisis in the development of this phase of our policy. The financing of exports through government grants to foreign countries is increasingly distasteful to both the giver and the recipients. But Europe needs our exports. Will we permit Europe to pay for them through the goods we import from Europe? The reciprocal trade agreements soon come up for renewal. Even if they are renewed

without being weakened they do not go far enough. The Detroit Board of Trade, representing 6,000 business men, calls for an increased assault upon the barriers that prevent the nations from trading with one another. This call if widely supported may well signal the coming of one of the most promising developments of the postwar period.

Let no one underestimate what is at stake in this call for freerer trade. If the countries of western and central Europe can really get on to a self-suporting basis; if our participation with them in NATO produces an assurance that they have a real future and are not likely to be overrun; if they themselves move on through the Schuman Plan and other measures to develop freer trade within Europe as well as between Europe and the outside world; then we may see that area of the free world developing an attraction for Russia's satellites in eastern Europe that may prove irresistible. It is under such circumstances alone, along with the attainment of an equilibrium of military power, that the voluntary withdrawal of Russia's troops to her own borders is likely to occur. Only then could true liberation come to the satellites, a liberation without war.

Technical Assistance

The social revolution now going on in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and other regions is responsible for another feature of our changed American policy—the increasing concern of our government for the technical assistance of underdeveloped areas. Various motives have combined to make this technical assistance possible. We do not want these areas to yield to communism because of the despair of the people who live in them. Moreover, these areas are the best and in some cases the only sources for materials this country needs. Then there is the sheer weight on the American conscience of the misery of the people in these lands.

We can do a good many things to alleviate this misery. These countries need capital, technicians, markets—and freedom. All of these needs we can supply better than the communists. We still have the hang-over of feudalism, native corruption, and colonialism with which to contend. But we are not without resources in competing with communists for the goodwill of the people in these lands. What is essential is that we put our minds to it.

In summary let us say that we do not believe that American policy as of today involves any basic challenge to the United Nations. The balance of power we are trying to achieve will help the U.N. rather than hinder it. As we draw nearer this balance the Russians will probably descend on the U.N. and its agencies and seek to use what they have neglected or scorned. In fact their attitude toward the U.N. may become a sign of whether in their opinion we are approaching an equilibrium. As far as economic amelioration and cultural improvements are concerned, our national programs and those of the U.N. can be related in terms of mutual support.

III

We are now at a critical point in the development of both the United Nations and post-war American policy. Much depends on how the opinion-making agencies view the situation. Among these agencies are the churches. What can the churches do now that will strengthen the forces making for peace?

Patience and Hope

First, they can help to create the patience and fortitude upon which both the United Nations and our own government must count if we are to weather the storms of this epoch. We are in for a period of tension that will last beyond our lifetime. There have been periods—the half-century preceding World War I for instance—when men worked against a background of order. They assumed order, and they worked for progress—the improvement of the order that they had. Today we have to give priority to order. We cannot assume it.

The international order has been destroyed. The re-establishment of that order when once destroyed has usually been a tough and terrible task. It is so today. And when you seek not only to re-establish but to improve at the same time you are attempting something that only prolonged and undiscourageable effort can carry through.

The churches have a faith born of the revelation of God and tested by tragic human experiences that should help men weather such a period as ours. Let the churches be true to their deepest insights. Let them tell men the truth about themselves and their world. Let them arouse no false hopes, but let them seize on the hopeful aspects of events as they transpire and then seek to enlarge the area of hope.

Loyalty to the U. N.

Second, because it is our duty to enlarge the area of hope, the churches can encourage loyalty to the United Nations as today embodying, under God, many of the hopes of men for a better world.

The U.N. is the one meeting place of Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas; the free world and the communist world. Its debates help to form world opinion on many issues. In its councils, large and small nations alike have a right to be heard. Before it as a world tribunal the underprivileged can have their day in court. It is the most impressive symbol in existence of the human race as a whole. It is the one political organization around which the hopes of men can gather regardless of the barriers that separate them. If we are to escape all-out war in our time it will probably be in considerable measure because the common interests and the moral judgments of mankind expressed through the United Nations have made themselves felt on the great nations so that it has become possible for other nations to live with them in peace.

The United Nations is no luxury. To contemporary man it is a sheer necessity. It is against the background of this conviction that all objections to the U.N. should be considered, and all changes in its Charter and program should be effected.

The churches can assimilate into their programs of religious education study of the humanitarian work of the U.N., the implications of its Declaration of Human Rights, and the promise of the aims of the organization as a whole. The historic social teachings of the churches provide the foundation for the presentation of these contemporary approaches to world peace and security.

The churches can, further, provide young people with the motivation and direction for entering international service through the U.N. and other channels. The churches ought to present this kind of work to their youth as fully as important a Christian vocation as the ministry or social work.

IV

We have tried to make it clear that, for many reasons, the preservation and continued vitality of the United Nations should be a central objective of American policy. The future of the United Nations should be jeopardized neither by nationalistic propaganda belittling its role in world affairs, nor by well-intentioned efforts to make it bear prematurely responsibilities it is not yet able to bear. In reconciling the policies of the United Nations and of our own government, and in criticizing the policies of both organizations so that all their policies may serve the cause of peace, the churches have an important part to play.

No one can foresee the future. There are no guarantees in history. The purposes of God remain through the centuries unfathomable to mortals. Nevertheless we may rejoice that, to adapt Browning's words, "our times are in His hand", and that he is a God of mercy as well as judgment.

Tariffs, Trade, and Raw Materials: A Study of the National Interest

Fred W. Riggs

The restrictions recently imposed on the import of Danish blue cheese are only part of a rising tide of barriers raised by the United States against imports. The Dutch, the Canadians, the Australians, and the Turks have imposed, or are considering the imposition of, retaliatory trade curbs. The Dutch have cut back wheat imports from the United States. Turkey, a major recipient of American aid, has raised tariffs on typewriters, refrigerators, machines for baking, ice-making, pasteurizing, milling, and washing—important import items from the United States—in reply to American restrictions on the purchase of dried figs.

As the Republican administration takes power in Washington, it faces sharp pressures from Congress on behalf of special interest groups for further barriers against foreign goods. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act expires this year. Unless the Republicans strongly support the extension and strengthening of liberal trade policies, an important bulwark of the reviving free world will be undermined.

The Republican leadership is pledged to reduce taxes and re-examine foreign aid. Certainly the expansion of American imports is one of the main ways of helping other countries to pay for the goods they want from us, rather than to depend on gifts from the American tax-payer. More imports will reduce the need for foreign aid and taxes. But the pressure of protection-seeking American manufacturers is hard for the average congressman to resist.

Obstacles to Expanded World Trade

There is little disagreement about the essential desirability of expanding world trade. A highly complex industrial economy, such as ours, depends for its existence on the import of raw materials unobtainable at home. Moreover, America's overseas allies cannot become stable and self-sustaining unless they import goods to pay for the products they need and can obtain only from the United States.

There are, however, many obstacles to the practical achievement of more world trade. The Customs Simplification Bill, first introduced in 1950, is one of the most obvious and painless ways to ease the import of commodities not barred by prohibitive tariff restrictions. It has still to obtain Congressional sanction. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a multilateral treaty negotiated to implement the reciprocal trade agreements program, is being continually eroded by new restrictions. The projected International Trade Organization has withered on the Congressional vine. Even where tariffs have not been raised, the proliferation of new types of restrictions—import quotas, export controls, unfavorable exchange rates for different categories of foreign goods, and prohibitions based on alleged sanitary precautions—have reduced trade volume.

One need not speak of Christian ethics, ultimate values, or even of human justice, in discussing the need for measures to make possible greatly increased world trade. National interest alone requires that this be done. Fortunately, in this instance, what suits the national interest is also in the interest of other nations. The obstacles arise, not from national pride or selfishness, but rather from parochial interests.

I

In speaking of measures which might be adopted to open the doors for world trade, different proposals are advanced, each of which must be judged both in terms of its feasibility and of its inherent risks to human welfare and justice.

The first proposal is that we re-establish

the international gold standard, or at least make different currencies fully convertible. It is argued that once a free world market had been established and governments had ceased to intervene with the normal operation of the laws of supply and demand, then the material requirements of the nations would be automatically satisfied and peace and justice would be restored.

This kind of proposal appeals particularly to the middle class mind, to those who think the government has been intervening too much in the economic sphere—that, in short, the last twenty years have witnessed the advance upon our country of "creeping socialism".

Arguments against the International Gold Standard

The argument against this proposal is first, and practically, that it is a kind of archaistic fantasy that can not be implemented in the real world. A more important reply, however, is that the demand for an international gold standard is a demand for precisely the kind of political organization of society that has, in the recent past, been largely responsible for major social catastrophes, for economic depressions, inflations, and international conflicts.

The international gold standard was an attempt to regulate the amount of money in circulation in a country by the impersonal forces of the market, by the amount of a single commodity, gold, available in the country. Since the amount of gold available fluctuated in accordance with the movement of trade, complicated by the imposition of huge indemnities because a country had been defeated in war, or by the flight of capital because people lost confidence in their country's currency, the economic health of a nation ceased to be the responsibility of society and its leaders. This situation proved intolerable, and during the 20's and 30's country after country abandoned the gold standard and adopted a national currency regulated by conscious political decisions. The United States itself, although retaining a symbolic gold value for its dollar, no longer permits its currency supply to be determined by the availability of a single commodity.

II

The alternative to an effort to restore the regulation of trade by an international gold standard or by the pure forces of a market system is conscious regulation and planning. This may be done at the national or the international levels. For the present we have a system of partially national and growingly international controls. The dangers inherent in this system are vast. The potentialities, if the system is carefully developed, are even promising. There is at least as much chance that the desired increase in the total volume of world trade may result from planning as from the automatic operation of impersonal market forces.

The tariffs are themselves an instrumentality of national control. So are all the new devices of quantitative import and export regulation, of multiple exchange systems, of marketing and purchasing boards, stockpiling, and long-term trade contracts. On the international level the emergence of the Schuman Plan represents a high degree of international planning for coal and steel in Western Europe. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation established under the impact of the Marshall Plan, the International Materials Conference, the International Wheat Agreement of 1949, the regional economic commissions of the United Nations, and various other enterprises—all symbolize the emergence of new types of international economic planning.

But how do or can these plans work? With what problems do they deal, on what levels, and with what effectiveness? We could discuss many kinds of trade: the trade in manufactured goods, in services, and in raw materials; or we could discuss the peculiar trade problems of different regions of the world. Here we shall discuss mainly the trade in raw materials.

III

The raw materials problem has become so acute for the United States, and it is so

intimately related to the development of sources of supply abroad and the expansion of world trade, that President Truman, in January 1951, established a Materials Policy Commission under the chairmanship of William S. Paley. The Commission's report, *Resources for Freedom,* published in June 1952, presents in five volumes a comprehensive picture of the probable raw material needs of the United States over the next 25 years, and demonstrates convincingly that the maintenance, to say nothing of the raising, of American living standards will require a continuously increasing import of foreign materials.

Until the 1940's, we exported more raw materials than we imported; we produced more raw materials than we consumed. Today, however, we import more such materials than we export, and we are using more raw materials in our factories than we can produce. There are now only two metals, magnesium and molybdenum, for which we do not depend, at least partially, on foreign supplies.

Once we were huge exporters of copper, lead, and zinc. Today we are the world's largest importers of these metals. In 1925, for example, we exported about 200,000 tons of copper, but in 1950 imported about 450,000 tons. Although we still produce much of the world's petroleum and iron ore, we have begun to meet our need for them by imports. In other key materials, especially many needed for the production of steel, the United States is almost wholly dependent on foreign suppliers.

For years we have had to import all or most of our supply of tin, antimony, chromite, nickel, manganese, rubber, potash, mercury, and tungsten, while buying abroad substantial quantities of wool, aluminum, and nitrates.

Distribution of Raw Materials

American reliance on foreign supplies of raw materials will present increasing difficulties as the years pass. Three major factors will contribute to this growing problem: (1) The supply available in the United States is being rapidly depleted, especially in certain materials. (2) The demand for materials is growing rapidly. (3) The presently less developed countries of the world, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, are embarking on programs of industrial development that will greatly increase their own need for the raw materials they may now be sending to us.

IV

Although the raw materials of the United States are already intensively exploited, there are major deposits abroad which have not yet begun to yield, or may not even have been discovered. The materials needs of the future will be met in large part from these still under-utilized reserves. But it is not a simple matter to obtain them. Often they are found in remote hinterlands far from cheap means of transportation. Huge capital investments of mining equipment and smelters may first be necessary. Moreover, many of the governments of these countries oppose the further expansion of raw materials exports, preferring instead to stimulate the development of diversified industries at home, especially to make use of their own raw materials.

This attitude grows out of historical experience still fresh in their minds. The fluctuations of world markets, notably during the depression of the 1930's, brought economic catastrophe to countries that depended largely on the export of a few raw materials. Moreover, in many countries where mines and plantations were largely in the hands of foreigners, it was natural for local leaders to feel that the riches of their lands were being taken from them for the profit of outsiders, and that their own social order was being disrupted if not destroyed by the impact of an alien economic system. Often enough economic exploitation was accompanied by political imperialism, and it is not strange if people who have but recently won their political freedom should seek to throw off remaining foreign influences in their national economy, and to prevent the establishment of new ties.

The apparent irrationality of such actions as the Iranian oil nationalization program is so striking that it should force us to make a deeper study of the reasons behind the action. The economic and political problems that have resulted from Western investment programs in non-Western countries, although real enough, are surely but surface phenomena as compared with the deep, underlying social changes which have been influenced by the materials industries. Even the rise of nationalist agitation and expressions of racial pride are but symptoms of something more basic.

Social Upheaval and Disruption

The simple fact is that these societies have all been going through the most profound kinds of social upheaval and disruption, and that the intrusion of the Western economic system, spearheaded by programs to extract raw materials, has speeded up this process of catastrophic change.

The transformation of subsistence agricultural economies into cash economies, the destruction of native handicrafts in the face of competition from the textile mills and factories, the growth of absentee landlordism, the infringement on communal lands, the introduction of alien (Chinese or Indian) laborers and the siphoning of men from villages to mines, plantations, or urban areas: all these things undermined the old order and substituted a regime in which only the forces of the market and of naked power remained to govern the relations between men.

Small wonder that against such a background the irrational forces of fear and hatred have been directed, with whirlwind fury, upon the most logical scapegoats, the visible symbols of the Western political and economic system. If we of the Western world are to deal effectively with this situation, not only in terms of a Christian impulse to extend the hand of fellowship to a distraught people, but also in terms of American national interest which, among other things, requires the import of growing supplies of raw materials, then at least our first obligation is to understand the realities of the situation, and to come to terms with them in some sensible way.

V

The coming to terms must be done by business men, by governments, by voluntary agencies such as the foreign mission enterprise, and by international organizations. The American investor in overseas development, to begin at the level of the business man, must adopt a new viewpoint and new policies, as indeed the more enlightened have already begun to do. The essence of this new view is that no foreign investment program can be sound that does not bring recognizable benefits to the resource country as well as to the investor. A foreign concession cannot be treated as a reserve to be brought into production only when it serves to maximize profits for the investing company. It must be viewed instead as part of the heritage of a nation which wants it operated so as to contribute to its own economic and social well-being. The investor receives certain rights in exchange for which he undertakes a trust. He can validate his claim to the rights only on condition that he fulfill the responsibilities of the trust. The claims of a human society must take precedence over those of the market.

In some recent concession agreements investors have shown a new awareness of this changed relationship. Some concerns, for example, have encouraged local participation in management and operations, trained local professional and technical personnel, and given greater responsibility to local managers, or formed overseas subsidiaries which operate with considerable autonomy. The oil companies operating in Venezuela and Saudi Arabia have been notable in this regard.

Another device has been to encourage the participation of local capital in a development program. Some investors restrict themselves to a minority position in foreign enterprises. American concessionaries have also attempted to prevent conflicts of interest by agreements which give the local company a 50% share in profits, or provide for rapid amortization of the investment,

after which the property reverts to the local government, with the investing concern continuing on a management-contract basis, if this is satisfactory to all parties. When investors begin to realize that overseas operations do not take place in a vacuum, but affect many aspects of the social organism of other nations, they can devise many ways to make mutually acceptable the development programs which are, in the long run, beneficial to all concerned.

VI

The United States government also has a major role to play. It can help produce the framework within which American investors and foreign nations can cooperate for mutual advantage. It can, for example, conclude treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation, which may include provisions affecting the rights and status of American investors. Another device consists of special executive agreements for a limited number of years, under which the United States might guarantee the purchase of a definite quantity of raw materials at a minimum price. The United States would also agree to facilitate investments, and in return the contracting country would pledge its cooperation in overcoming the obstacles to investment.

There may even be situations in which, because of the high risks involved, private capital could not be induced to finance development, but the need for the materials involved would be so great that the United States government itself would be justified in making loans or grants, or in participating with private capital in financing a development project. Already this has taken place, as in the Export-Import Bank loans to Brazil to pay for the construction of a railway from the port of Vitória to the Itabira Iron Mines.

In other circumstances the government can provide major assistance to foreign production plans by making long-term purchase contracts in connection with its stockpile program, or by offering to maintain a price floor on the commodity by buying up surplus when the price begins to fall below the floor. These measures would encourage investors to expand production facilities abroad.

Technical Assistance

More important for long-range coperation in development and trade, however, is the idea of technical cooperation. In connection with Point IV programs there have been sharp debates over the relative importance of agricultural versus industrial development, and materials production has sometimes been regarded as antithetical to these other programs. Yet both are needed for balanced development—there are only differences of priority and one must often choose how to distribute scarce capital and personnel resources. Highways, power, trained people, more food and manufactures, better health—all are essential for development. Expanded resource production contributes to them, and they contribute to resource production.

The critical issues lie not in this area so much as in how the new social and economic programs impinge upon the social fabric as a whole. It is not easy to suggest changes that help reweave a torn communal web. Although no program can take root that does not respond to locally felt needs, the indigenous leader may not be a sure guide because, recognizing the poverty of his land in contrast to the affluence of the West, and putting a low estimate on the Westerner's ability to comprehend other than material values, he may demand a dose of economic goods as the medicine needed for an ailing body social.

But the Westerner who would provide technical aid must try to find ways in which to reconstitute on a new level societies that have been bruised and fractured, to reconstruct the family and village structure, to revitalize values and moral codes. Within such a framework it should be possible to increase private investments so as to produce more raw materials and thus pay for and obtain the goods needed to prevent hunger and cold and illness, to give body to the restored social organism.

VII

Programs to increase production abroad and to make possible higher living standards, however, cannot succeed unless at the same time America buys more from abroad, for to continue indefinitely supporting foreign purchases by gifts from the public treasury would surely frustrate the aims of both giver and receiver. So we return to the need for lowering barriers to trade or planning an increase of commerce.

The present tariff pattern is the result of a series of reductions carried out in pursuance of the reciprocal trade agreement program, counteracted in some instances by new impositions. It bears little relationship, however, to the needs of other countries, or even to America's own needs. Thus certain critical materials, such as tungsten, fluorspar, aluminum, and magnesium, have high duties. In other cases, however, the tax is very low, and certain materials, such as natural rubber, industrial diamonds, tin, and quartz, may be imported duty free.

The effect of a tariff rate varies according to the market conditions of each material. Thus in the case of mercury, which is controlled by a monopoly, even reduction of the high tariff might have little effect if the overseas supplier decided to impose a counterbalancing price increase. In other circumstances, even a small tariff may have quite restrictive effects, especially if the price of domestic produce is almost as low as the world market price. When domestic controls keep prices down, even very small duties may be enough to keep foreign sellers from attempting to market their materials in the United States.

Our Intentions Often Suspected

Frequently a higher duty is imposed on processed materials than on ores or crude materials. Yet it may be more economical to have heavy ores processed near the source of supply where labor is relatively cheap, and transportation costs for the processed material are less than those for heavy ores. Moreover, with countries insistent on developing their own secondary processing industries, this kind of tariff policy appears to confirm the view that America wants to limit these countries to the export of raw material and prevent their industrial development. This in turn confirms suspicions of American intentions, and increases resistance to American participation in new materials development programs.

In dealing with this situation it is certainly essential that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program be extended. But it is also clear that, in many cases where barriers cannot be reduced as a counterpart to the reduction by another country of its barriers against our exports, new authority needs to be enacted by Congress authorizing unilateral reduction or elimination of import duties on materials for which the United States is expected to become increasingly dependent on imports.

Tariff restrictions, however, are not the only kind of barriers to expansion of trade. An anachronistic type of barrier persists in the Buy American Act of 1933 and similar State and Federal laws enacted under the pressure of depression psychology. These laws compel state and federal authorities to buy domestically produced materials with certain limited exceptions. Even materials for strategic stockpiles must be purchased from domestic producers if the price is less than 25% above that asked for foreign suppliers. Yet the underlying idea of the stockpiling program is to conserve domestic resources and bring into the country foreign supplies which might not be available in the event of war. Certainly the continuation of the Buy American laws serves no useful purpose and is a harmful barrier to trade and resource development.

Special Interest Groups

It must, of course, be remembered that the reduction of existing tariff protections, or the shift of government purchasing from domestic to foreign suppliers, will work hardship on specific local interests. The whole nation should not be forced to pay permanently for the privileges of parochial groups, but it does have an obligation to ease the transition costs of producers forced

into bankruptcy by a governmental action. This might take the form of aid in finding new ways of making profitable use of equipment that can no longer be used for old purposes, and helping labor migrate to places of greater opportunity.

The obstacles to trade include not only barriers against imports, but also provisions restricting exports. Washington now requires export licenses for various purposes, and under the Defense Production Act priority allotments are now also required. You can not obtain steel to use in the construction of an oil well abroad without first obtaining both an allotment and an export license.

It is important that the administration of all these controls should be carried out with full recognition of the need for facilitating the development of overseas productive capacity.

Programs to control the general development of trade face one of their knottiest problems in the frequent and wide fluctuations of world prices of raw materials. This problem can only be noted, since space does not permit its discussion.

VIII

The discussion to this point has dealt exclusively with the situation in the free world. It is necessary to add some observations on the impact of Soviet policy upon the trade of the world. American policy in the last few years has undertaken to suspend all shipments of strategic materials to the Soviet Union and its associated countries, and simultaneously to use our influence to induce other countries to curtail such shipments. Thus there has developed a partitioning of the world into two major divisions with separate trade systems in each part. Nevertheless, certain kinds of trade continue across the "Iron Curtain", and problems of a most perplexing kind are occasioned thereby.

Hong Kong, for example, depends for its life on its trade with the mainland. The Chinese Communists, for their part, could readily annex the British colony, and no doubt continue to tolerate it only because it provides them with a convenient trade channel to the outside world.

Markets Needed for European Goods

On another level it is apparent that the new Soviet policy toward the West is to try to strengthen the divisive forces between the United States and its European allies, and to foment anti-American sentiment among the people of Asia. With rising industrial production in Western Europe, it is apparent that expanding extra-European markets and sources of materials will have to be found, especially if the United States continues to be unwilling or unable to absorb a larger part of Europe's manufactures. The natural economic pressures for a resumption of more trade with Eastern Europe—a natural market as well as a source of materials—coincide with a new trend of thought in Europe about the best strategy for dealing with the Soviet controlled countries. This strategy has been identified by the slogan "rollback" in contrast to the slogan of "containment". It calls for an effort to strengthen all possible contacts with the people of Eastern Europe in the hope that ultimately the means of weakening the tie with Moscow—à la Tito—will become apparent. Trade, which has been demanded from Moscow itself, provides one way to renew and strengthen these Western ties in Eastern Europe.

West Europeans who advocate this policy think that it coincides with the slogan of Mr. Dulles, "liberation", except that it does not imply any effort to stimulate violent revolution in Eastern Europe. If this political sentiment in Europe should gain strength at the same time that economic tensions grow, tensions that can only be relieved by revival of East-West trade, there will be strong pressure on Washington to revise its restrictions on the shipment of goods to Soviet territories. The alternative would be either much more substantial imports of European manufactures, or further large-scale aid grants. But the continuation of economic aid on a large scale has become equally unacceptable to Europeans and to the new Administration. It is true that the

provision for offshore purchases under the Mutual Security and NATO program will finance much of Europe's continuing dollar deficit. Nevertheless, continuation of our present trade policies regarding European commerce with Russia and its satellites might well deepen the splits in the free world which it has now become Moscow's policy to foment.

It is not inconceivable that, after the implications of this situation become more widely understood in Washington, policies may be adopted which will permit trade across the Iron Curtain, and at the same time allow more imports into the United States. In that event the challenge of Russian policy will have brought a creative response in the free world.

IX

At the request of President Truman, a special study is now being conducted by the Public Advisory Board of the Mutual Security Agency of measures regarding trade and tariffs that might be adopted on the expiration of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1953. We have yet to see, however, what attitude the Republican administration will take on this issue, and whether or not it will be disposed to accept the recommendations, however enlightened, of a study group established by the outgoing Democratic regime.



Evidence that among industrial leaders there is an awakening to the needs of our altered international relationships was provided by the statement of John R. Suman, vice-president of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, and vice chairman of the International Relations Committee of the N.A.M., at the opening session of the N.A.M. conference on December 3, 1952. He urged measures to implement the new slogan, "Trade, Not Aid", declaring: "As we stop giving and start buying more from our friends abroad, we will be helping them along the road to recovery. We can do that most effectively by reducing our own trade restrictions. We can show other peoples that we are neither machine-mad nor money-mad, but hardworking and sympathetic men and women who realize the way we live depends directly upon the living standards of others." The International Relations Committee of the N.A.M. also went on to urge that a survey be made of United States tariff laws to determine how they could be reduced or removed to make possible the "Trade, Not Aid" policy.

It is scarcely realistic to expect the leaders of industry and government to adopt policies based on altruistic and sacrificial goals. But we can hope that they will not try to lead a retreat toward some imaginary and utopian kind of anarchy—both economic and international—that was tried and abandoned in the 19th and early 20th centuries, since its abandonment came about not because of any failure of nerve or from a conspiracy, but because that kind of anarchy clearly destroyed the social and human values we hold most dear. Instead we can dare to hope that American leaders will try to find, however haltingly, the road toward some kind of world order in which our economic, to say nothing of our political and cultural, interdependence will be given structural and functional shape.

REVIEWS

Notes on "Cultural Diplomacy"

The Taming of the Nations: A Study of the Cultural Bases of International Policy, by F. S. C. Northrop. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1952. 362 pages. $5.00.

This is an important book. So far as this reviewer knows there has been nothing like it since William Ernest Hocking's *The Spirit of World Politics* (1928). Like Hocking more than twenty years ago, Northrop revives a very ancient idea, namely that philosophers should give specific advice on concrete world affairs. A distastefully new idea, perhaps, to those schooled in modern philosophical abstraction; but one entirely congenial to the mind of anyone familiar with the great philosophic tradition. Were not Confucius and Plato, as well as Aristotle, advisers to the rulers of their time?

It is unfortunate in a way that the Yale professor, in 1952, could not have borrowed the Harvard professor's title of two decades before. *The Taming of the Nations* has less descriptive merit than *The Spirit of World Politics,* running so close to outright sensationalism that one cannot avoid a feeling of regret. For Northrop's position is actually sound and not in the least sensational. He correctly relates all freedom to that which is authentically spiritual, and writes cogently of those spiritual bases on which nations to be free must stand.

The argument gets under way with astonishing rapidity, bringing the reader swiftly to an a priori judgment, namely, that "national self-interest [i.e. power politics] will not work in foreign affairs" (p. 1), but must give way to a broader and profounder outlook which takes as its criterion "the normative living law of each nation or cultural group" (p. 7). Obviously, this "living law" refers to that "inner order of norms" which in turn creates those particular ideals by which a given people measures its common life.

The formula for what may be called a cultural diplomacy proves to be, when finally evolved, what Northrop defines as a "living law pluralism". According to this pattern the United Nations must give up, for example, its erroneous assumption of an existent common ideology for the whole world, especially since it breaks down anyway under pressure during every crisis, when each separate nation looks in panic upon the total situation as if its own survival were the only absolute norm.

What is most necessary to a functioning world order is a guarantee to each culture that its own ideology will be enriched rather than destroyed by the pooling of humanity's interests in a united effort to use rather than abuse the power unleashed in an atomic age, and will be supported not undermined by an international police force strong enough to stop any aggressor. Northrop effectively lays bare the actual reason why other people "don't like us", and why the moral solidarity of the world was not, for instance, behind Korea as it might or should have been.

It is interesting to compare *The Taming of the Nations* with Northrop's earlier book, *The Meeting of East and West.* Much could be said regarding the likenesses and differences. Yet the main difference seems to be that in *The Meeting of East and West,* the author's intent was to point out that *we* in the West should understand the East, while in *The Taming of the Nations* the point is stressed that we should convey to the East the feeling that *they* are understood and appreciated. The two objectives may appear to be similar although reversed. Actually, however, the former is essentially scientific, the latter intrinsically religious. It might astonish many, including the author himself, to find any of Northrop's writings described in religious terms. What seems to have happened, however, is that the philosopher-politician has finally come abreast of the missionary. "If men will

think deeply," said Socrates, "they will think alike." And this book is deep thinking, if nothing else.

The conviction that Northrop expresses in his latest work has determined the missionary approach to world problems for at least one whole generation. It is nothing else than *love,* both in the Christian and in the psychological meaning of that world, the quiet self-affirmation that gives a person self-respect, projects itself into other persons, and is then taken back into himself. Thus, the self becomes a participant in the lives of many selves, while they become an integral part of his life. It is then possible to "hate the sin and love the sinner" because one hates his own sin even more while also maintaining a true self-respect despite his guilty feeling.

This profound capacity for self-respecting altruism—the true "I-thou" relationship—is illustrated by a statement in *Rethinking Missions* which Hocking helped to prepare. "The missionary lives among men as the undiscouraged lover of their ideal interests as well as of themselves" (p. 78). To this statement may be added a remark made by a Chinese student to the reviewer that "the way to become a good Confucianist is to be a Christian". The apostle Paul long since declared (I Corinthians 13:12) that through the love that abides we shall one day understand as all along we have been understood.

Yet nearly everything that the United States and even the United Nations has done since World War II has tended to rob the less powerful peoples of their self-respect. The natural reaction of these other peoples is, therefore, to withhold from us the moral support which we expect from them. "Our dollar aid, for example," says Northrop, "has had a similar effect; it suggests to West Germans, Mexicans and South Americans, Muslims, and Asians that their morals can be bought" (p. 301).

Yet, though we may have failed by and large to convey our respect for the cherished values of our allies, the communists have carried on a campaign of deceit which will be in the long run more self-defeating than our blind yet well-meaning ego continuity; for while pretending to support the national aspirations of the countries they intend to take over, they end up by demolishing them. Northrop makes short work of communism—"If ever there was a contradictory philosophy," he remarks succinctly, "it is this one" (p. 233). But how indeed are the peoples of the Orient to know this? They know more, perhaps, than Northrop realizes.

Roderick Scott

National Interest and Foreign Policy

American Diplomacy: 1900–1950, by George F. Kennan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.

George Kennan, distinguished counselor to the State Department, provides us with a sober and rewarding analysis of some major phases of American foreign policy of the last half-century. In the opening essays the emotionalism and the semi-conscious imperialism of the Spanish-American War are exposed, along with the ambiguities and generalities of the Open Door doctrine for China. This case material is employed to introduce some of the author's leading arguments: that American public opinion overestimates (1) the extent of world public opinion and its ability to overrule the governments of nations, and (2) the ability of international "law" to influence or coerce the behavior of nation states.

A brief but penetrating critique of American behavior in World War I, from the period of neutrality to the crusade of 1917–18, exposes our national weakness for combining war hysteria and impractical idealism. A similar analysis of World War II strengthens one of Kennan's major theses: that American fervor in wartime "lies less in any objective understanding of the wider isues involved than in a profound irritation over the fact that other people have finally provoked us . . . to take up arms." We have great difficulty as a nation "in employing force for rational and restricted purposes rather than for purposes

which are emotional and to which it is hard to find a rational limit." This inability stems from our ignorance of historical processes and of the relation of power to the purposes of democracy. Deeper understanding would help us to avoid the extremes of idealist pacifism and crusading militarism.

Our most serious American fault is seen to lie in "the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems". Instead of seeking the adjustment and compromise of conflicting national interests in the field of world politics we tend to evade these primary issues by demands for "international law" and the punishment of "wrongdoers". Of far greater importance is the "forgotten art of diplomacy".

Kennan belongs to the "realist" school of political scientists. His premises and conclusions are similar to those of Nicholas Spyckman and Hans Morgenthau, whose contributions to the analysis of international politics are impressive and useful. In common with these other men, Kennan avoids the cynicism of some of the so-called "realists", but has to rest content with the concept of the "national interest" as the ultimate standard for measuring the nation's foreign policy.

A Christian critique of Kennan's position will not necessarily find fault with the above, except to point to the ambiguity of the concept of "national interest". Kennan fails to make explicit the more ultimate norm by which national interest is or should be determined. By implication it is at least a democratic or humanistic norm, encouraging the sense of obligation to respect the right of other nations to exist and to pursue "legitimate" interests, and discouraging the vanities which are only "delusions of superiority".

The essays conclude with reprints of two previously published articles on Soviet-American relations, urging a long-run American policy of firmness, patience, and "containment" of Soviet expansionism, hoping for modifications of Soviet policy or for eventual disunity within the Russian sphere. This reviewer wishes that these concluding articles could be edited and translated for popular consumption behind the Iron Curtain. The fact that they cannot be distributed "over there", and that modern technology can be used by a totalitarian regime to entrench itself politically and to enslave the minds of its subjects, are some of the troublesome facts that Kennan may not sufficiently have considered in developing his long-run hopes.

But let us hope that the author's hopes are justified, while we share his concern for a patient and responsible American foreign policy. We can profit from the wisdom of this book, and we can transcend it at certain points by an explicit Christian testimony to the God before whom our conceptions of the "national interest" lie in constant need of redemption from idolatry.

Vernon H. Holloway

Rediscovery of a Western Faith

A Declaration of Faith, by Herbert Agar. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952. 237 pages. $3.00.

Many voices are raised today to utter a plea for a moral virility in the West capable of matching the strength of mechanistic civilization. They all are agreed that the great need of the hour is the affirmation and implementation of moral values. In this book, Herbert Agar seeks to point out precisely what these values are, finding them in the maze of affirmations and contradictions in the West's history.

The articles of a Western faith contain four elements: freedom of conscience, natural law, natural piety, and an absolute sanction. The last three were known to the classical world from which Western civilization sprang. But the Western world was born when the Christian dualism was established—when the distinction "between God and Caesar was added to the classical concept of law".

As Mr. Agar begins his search backward in time for ideas and examples, he calls for a reverent use of history—an approach which does not view history solely as a

recurrent conflict between good men and bad men or as "a series of steppingstones toward the twentieth century". Every period in the history of the West discloses the fact that war is the mirror of man's predicament. Force is substituted for creativity, for inventiveness, for constructive acts of will. The classical world lost its freedom through war. Like Greece, Rome founded union on force. Rome did contribute a unifying law but too late; and she failed to solve the problem of the City of the Rich and the City of the Poor. The Thirty Years' War ruined the Germanies and transformed a cynical use of piety into sheer cynicism. The Hundred Years' War was likewise fought with one end in view—the annihilation of the enemy. In the nineteenth century, democratic enthusiasm was harnessed to nationalism, resulting in the idolatry of the nation-state. All of these cases, and others, represent a disavowal of natural law as the unifying force of society.

Two outstanding problems emerge from Mr. Agar's plea to the West to recover its moral resources and develop inner strength. First, the repeated distortions of the idea of the law of nature force in the question whether natural law ever can serve as a basis of Western unity. Mr. Agar himself makes the following statement:

> Ironically, the United States (whose freedom was founded on the law of nature) gave the best proof of how that law may be distorted when men identify "nature" with their own bad habits and forget that beyond nature lies God. Because the abolitionists called upon the higher law to discredit slavery, the slaveholders called upon it to defend their property in human bodies.

The second problem is inseparable from the first. It refers to the organ of appeal. The appeal of men to natural law has taken different forms in history, and in the modern world, groups of the same society are in conflict on the subject. Agar points out that in the classical world man appealed in silence and witnessed to natural law in his private conduct since the State was omnipotent and owned the Church. In the Middle Ages, he appealed through the Church which had become an autonomous power. In the modern West, he appeals through constitutional channels, and if they are not accepted, he appeals through force.

Do not these facts suggest that, to his plea for a recovery of resources and the development of inner strength, the author must envisage some kind of objective expression to Western unity? To what will the citizens of the various nations appeal? Can men, millions in number and living under the varied experiences of different nations, keep high ideas and ideals clearly and dynamically before themselves, when these ideas and ideals are in no sense embodied?

Mr. Agar provides us with a "declaration of faith". A faith creates a movement, a movement an institution. The institution always runs the risk of becoming an end in itself, but it is necessary as a vehicle of the faith.

George D. Kelsey

Religion and Culture in Europe

Understanding Europe, by Christopher Dawson. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1952. $3.50.

The aim of this important book has been stated by the author in the following words:

> I have attempted to study these three interrelated themes: that Europe is a society of peoples; that Europe is a spiritual unity, based on the tradition of Christian culture; and that the modern revolt against Europe is the inevitable result of its loss of the common spiritual aims and common system of moral values which it derived from the Christian tradition (Preface, page vi).

In this reviewer's judgment, the author succeeds notably in maintaining the first of these propositions while failing to substantiate the second and the third.

That Europe is not a natural, continental entity but a man-made, cultural complex is defended in the book's third chapter. As a "society of peoples" it has been shaped by "the tradition of independence and diver-

sity" operating at local, national, or regional levels. Mr. Dawson's insistence upon the importance of organic cultural communities rather than centers of political or economic power as the true nuclei of European life is well taken; it is also a timely warning to those who would federalize Europe according to some alien model, imposed by the devotees of "cosmopolitan internationalism". It is pointed out that "until we can regard states as neighbours within a local society as well as units in the balance of world power we shall not have created a civilized international order" (page 58).

From this viewpoint the development of modern Germany and Russia is atypical and aberrant. They are not really "European" at all. As one moves eastward, uniformity takes the place of diversity and the mass supplants the individual. As for Germany, the substitution of Prussian (Protestant) for Austrian (Catholic) leadership in the nineteenth century meant the abandonment of political sobriety and international responsibility. As for Russia, the old pattern of absolutism did not bend or break but only repeated itself in Czarism and Soviet Communism. Totalitarianism, says Dawson, "has come out of the non-political past, out of the night of serfdom and the anonymous existence of submerged masses and subject races" (page 115).

This book stands in the great tradition of cultural history on the grand scale, yet it abounds in detailed analysis and keen contemporary observation. The most surprising omissions or "blind spots" in it are the countries of France and Spain, which come in for only passing and superficial treatment. Is it possible that they have not been included in this account because France seems a part of the European "spiritual unity" of which the author speaks, but has largely repudiated the Christian tradition which he feels is basic, while Spain illustrates all too well the dangerous implications of that tradition, hardened into monistic ecclesiasticism and upheld by the methods of a military despotism? At all events, the second and third theses of the writer fail of proof because developments in these countries are not given due place.

We owe Mr. Dawson genuine gratitude for stressing the fact that our American situation is not fundamentally different from the European. Both face the problem of Western civilization as a whole. The common effort to solve that problem is one which "cannot be limited to immediate political ends, but must involve a deeper process of cooperation based on common spiritual principles" (page 182). But it is not clear enough either what these principles are, or how they are connected with urgent military and political exigencies.

At times, however, Mr. Dawson's unmistakable nostalgia for the medieval type of Christian culture throws considerable light on the nature of these principles. The unifying factor in Europe, he tells us, has been the Catholic Church and the *plebs Christiana* it created. Are we then to conclude that the renewal of European community must wait upon return to Rome? The author does not press this answer, but one can scarcely avoid the belief that it is his own prescription.

We do not have to agree with this implied solution, however, to appreciate the justice and penetration of much that is said in Dawson's book. We may heartily endorse the view that the cultural crisis can only be solved by "radical conversion and spiritual transformation". We can accept the challenge laid down to Christian education to overcome the disastrous dualism of religion and culture, by recovering the social ideal of Christendom. Most of all, we can approve the statement that "the mystery of faith brings all men together at the heart of life. . . Faith is therefore the beginning and end of Christian culture as it is the beginning and end of Christian morals. This is common to all forms of Christianity, Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant" (page 250).

This book points beyond itself, even beyond its intention, to that true community of faith which is the prerogative of no single church but the responsibility of all.

Roger Hazelton

A Study of War

War and Human Progress, by John U. Nef. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. $6.50.

Sub-titled "An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization", this book of 416 pages is the product of many years of painstaking research. In no sense a popular treatise, the notes on books quoted fill no less than 31 pages! It would be a miracle of authorship if so much material were presented in a lively style, with the writer's main points always rising above the mass of detail. The miracle was not achieved by Professor Nef. At the risk of being thought too impatient for guidance in dealing with the actual hot and cold wars now being waged, this reviewer must confess that he had a hard time getting interested in the fact that "plans for horse-drawn vehicles, encased in metal and armed with guns, go back in England at least to 1523, when Sir William Bulmer (1465–1531) sheriff of County Durham, wrote to the Earl of Surrey about six carts covered with steel and brass, each with eight men and guns" (p. 57). Page after page of that sort of thing—until the reader would like to know what the author is trying to prove.

Not that Professor Nef doesn't arrive at conclusions. The trouble seems to be that he found it impossible to omit anything once entered in his notebooks.

With this warning, and for the benefit of those who may be quite willing to plod through a lot of prosaically-written history if by doing so they can get a little more light on the historical relation between industrialism and war, let the book be a little more specifically described. The first section deals with "The New Warfare and the Genesis of Industrialism. Circa 1494 to circa 1640". Part Two treats of "Limited Warfare and Humane Civilization. Circa 1640 to circa 1740". Part Three considers "Industrialism and Total War. Circa 1740 to circa 1952". In this last section we learn that the industrial revolution did not, after all, begin in 1760. Seventeen hundred eighty-five is the crucial date. When you have read the sixteen pages of documentary proof, you will probably be glad to agree. What's the point? It has something to do with an indictment of industrialism—and I think it fair to say that Professor Nef dislikes the industrial society almost as much as he dislikes war. "Restraints upon men and societies, which made war more humane and reduced the amount of fighting among civilized peoples, were created before the triumph of industrial civilization. . . . Industrialism has helped to destroy the restraints." Or again, "The only justification for war is the defense of a culture worth defending, and the states of the modern world have less and less to defend beyond their material comforts. . ." From the last page: "The price of peace . . . is the renunciation, in large measure, of success as the guiding principle of thought, labor, and even of politics."

All this may be true. The author is a very learned man. He is also a deeply religious man: "When the mind of man has presented humanity with weapons that would be safe only in the hands of God, is it not evident that the only hope of staying the power of these weapons lies in redemption through Him?" It is, nevertheless, necessary to report that from this monumental study, which the jacket blurb calls "by far the most careful general discussion of war to appear in our century", one reader, in earnest search of moral insight and practical guidance, has been able to get little light on either the basic character of our society or what to do in the way of relieving present international tensions. The author does not believe that war furthers human progress. Neither do I.

Herman F. Reissig

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